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Abstract 
 
Gender mainstreaming emerged in the mid-1990s as an innovative and controversial policy tool for reducing 
gender inequalities. The European Union seeks to propagate the practice of gender mainstreaming both within 
EU institutions and among member states. Feminist scholars and policy elites discuss and debate gender main-
streaming widely, but have yet to consider how local feminist activists, who could play a central role in diffusing 
gender mainstreaming, understand, interpret and respond to this agenda. This paper examines whether and why 
local feminist movements in two cities in eastern Germany adopt gender mainstreaming. Consideration of the 
characteristics of the contexts in which local feminist movements are embedded clarifies the conditions under 
which social movements rally round new policy paradigms.  
 
*This research was supported by the National Science Foundation (Doctoral Dissertation Improvement Grant 
#0402513 with Robin Stryker), the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), and the Graduate School 
and Department of Sociology of the University of Minnesota, Twin Cities. 
 
Introduction 
 
Since the mid-1990s, gender mainstreaming has become an increasingly central part of the social pol-
icy agenda of the European Union (EU) and many of its member states. Gender mainstreaming seeks to as-
sess the gendered implications of policies and to integrate equal opportunities for women and men into pol-
icymaking at all levels of governance. While gender mainstreaming has sparked debate even among its propo-
nents within the EU’s governing bodies, gender mainstreaming is generally positioned as a new strategy or 
tool that will benefit feminist interests by challenging gender inequalities. 
 
Yet not all feminists embrace gender mainstreaming as a potentially helpful new policy agenda. This 
has been very evident in scholarly discussions and debates about gender mainstreaming (e.g., Daly 2005; Stra-
tigaki 2005; Verloo 2005; Woodward 2003). Feminist activists who typically advocate around policy issues 
also appear to have mixed responses to this policy concept, which may effect if and how gender mainstream-
ing diffuses across feminist social movements.  
 
This paper draws on perspectives on policy diffusion to explore the conditions under which existing 
social movements adopt new issues as part of their agenda. While not assuming a priori that social movement 
support will be necessary for the diffusion of a new policy, existing social movements and their attendant or-
ganizations often become key players in pushing for the adoption and/or enforcement of new policies, espe-
cially when such policies appear to further social movement goals. Environmental organizations, for example, 
have mobilized around new policy ideas and/or practices that they see as advancing their cause (Daley 2007). 
Still, not all social movements will advocate or serve as watchdogs for new policy ideas simply because they 
become available.  
 
To identify the diverse factors which influence whether social movements adopt or reject new policy 
paradigms as part of their agendas, I examine the level of adoption of gender mainstreaming within two local 
women’s movements in eastern Germany. Feminist activists and femocrats in the northeastern Baltic port of 
Rostock have actively adopted gender mainstreaming into local organizations, making gender mainstreaming 
a rallying point of their advocacy work. While my focus is on diffusion across social movements and not 
across state institutions, it is worth noting that, with pressure from feminist organizations, Rostock became 
the first city anywhere in Germany to pass a citywide gender mainstreaming ordinance in 2001. The ordinance 
requires all municipal agencies and their contractors to utilize gender mainstreaming to assess the gendered 
implications of policy practices and changes, and to make necessary corrections to avoid or reduce any gender 
disparities that are discovered. In the southeastern city of Erfurt, also in the former German Democratic Re-
public (GDR, or East Germany), however, policymakers and feminist activists had not taken any significant 
steps to integrate gender mainstreaming into their organizations through the end of 2005. In spite of a num-
ber of shared features and conditions across the two cities, and, perhaps even most importantly, in spite of a 
good deal of disagreement among feminists in both cities about the value of gender mainstreaming, the fate 
of the EU’s agenda for gender mainstreaming has proven quite different among feminist activists in these two 
settings thus far. 
 
While the extant scholarship on gender mainstreaming widely conceptualizes this policy agenda as 
primarily relevant at the national and supranational level (but see Greed 2004), gender mainstreaming can, 
and according to EU policymakers should, be implemented among local states. Yet to date, the focal points in 
analyses of gender mainstreaming have been on critical evaluations of gender mainstreaming theory and 
praxis by feminist scholars (Beveridge, Nott and Stephen 2000; Booth and Bennett 2002; Squires 2005; Ver-
loo 2001; Walby 2005; Woodward 2003) and/or on comparative analyses of national-level implementation 
(Daly 2005; True and Mintrom 2001; Woodward 2003). While such efforts provide valuable insight into the 
policy diffusion process at the national level—and have been especially influential in establishing that feminist 
transnational networks are central in the diffusion of gender mainstreaming across national borders (True and 
Mintrom 2001)—these accounts don’t explain local-level factors that might influence the adoption of gender 
mainstreaming among local feminist movements. The present research builds on these endeavors by examin-
ing the perspectives of non-elite, non-EU actors who, to date, have been notably absent in the scholarship on 
gender mainstreaming. This provides an important window into how social actors who are likely to be invol-
ved in its diffusion and implementation on the ground actually understand and receive gender mainstreaming.  
 
The rich literature on policy diffusion among states and state institutions informs the framework for 
exploring policy diffusion among feminist social movement actors. States and social movements typically face 
different constraints and opportunities and have different levels of accountability to the public. Nonetheless, 
general concepts used to explain policy diffusion across state and state institutions could help explain when 
and why policy ideas are picked up by social movements. I consider elements from several theoretical tradi-
tions in the literature on policy diffusion, and in doing so, demonstrate the utility of applying ideas from this 
body of scholarship to social movements. Internal determinants of social policy adoption include organiza-
tional resources, ideologies, institutional dynamics and capacity within a given feminist movement. Diffusion 
of innovation perspectives, on the other hand, focus on external determinants, such as pressures from exter-
nal sources, and opportunities and limitations presented by the state as relevant for shaping responses to new 
policies (Berry and Berry 1999; Daley 2007). Diffusion of innovation perspectives thus echo neo-institutional 
models that hone in on isomorphism and view policy adoption as a new way to gain legitimacy.  
 
Both internal and external factors also reflect processes occurring at multiple scales of action (Krook 
2006). The localities within which these feminist movements operate are nested in regional, national and 
transnational systems. I thus approach policy diffusion across social movements as potentially influenced not 
only by local and domestic factors, but also by transnational dimensions.  
 
I begin by introducing the complex gender mainstreaming paradigm and some of its possibilities and 
pitfalls. I then briefly discuss the research design and data sources utilized in this project. I subsequently turn 
to the cases at hand to illuminate why the local feminist movements in Rostock and Erfurt have responded so 
differently to gender mainstreaming as a policy innovation. I discover that feminist attitudes towards gender 
mainstreaming do not predict its adoption in these two cities, but rather that the conjuncture of a set of fac-
tors both internal and external to these movements helps explain the divergent levels of adoption of gender 
mainstreaming among local feminist movements.  
 
Understanding Gender Mainstreaming 
 
 Since its formal introduction into the European Commission in 1996, gender mainstreaming has 
been the source of considerable confusion and consternation among EU policymakers and the EU public 
alike. According to the Group of Specialists of the Council of Europe, gender mainstreaming is “the (re)or-
ganization, improvement, development and evaluation of policy processes, so that a gender equality perspec-
tive is incorporated in all policies, at all levels and at all stages, by the actors normally involved in policy-
making” (Group of Specialists on Mainstreaming 1998). Alternatively described in EU documents and by 
gender mainstreaming advocates as a theory, method, tool, strategy, concept, program or mechanism (Booth 
and Bennett 2002), gender mainstreaming seeks to provide new approaches for gender-sensitive policymaking 
by drawing attention to how policies at various levels of governance may differentially affect women and men 
and by redressing differences when they are discovered. Recognizing that even policies that appear gender 
neutral can have a differential impact, the gender mainstreaming approach calls for examination of the poten-
tially gendered effects of policies before they are implemented (Squires 2007).  
 
A core assumption underlying gender mainstreaming is that gender is socially created and embedded 
in organizations, including the state. Rather than denying the state’s complicity in gender inequality, the gen-
der mainstreaming framework recognizes that states (re)produce gender relations and inequalities, and there-
fore must be activated if gender equality is to be achieved (Schmidt 2005). Specifically, gender mainstreaming 
accepts the feminist contention that many state policies and practices which appear to be gender neutral are, 
in fact, based on men’s interests and an expectation of men citizens. Gender mainstreaming also calls for an 
interrogation of state policies to identify if and how gender is embedded. Gender mainstreaming pushes for 
incorporation of gender issues into all aspects of governance and public policy and moves against the treat-
ment of women’s issues as a distinct policy problem (Mazey 2001).  
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The gender mainstreaming approach also holds that gender inequalities harm both men and women. 
The goal, then, is to alter social structures so that gender inequalities are neutralized. Gender mainstreaming is 
thus different from equal treatment and positive action, which typically target only women in their efforts at 
placing women on equal footing with men, and represents a “third path” towards gender equality (Rees 1998). 
Gender mainstreaming also implies a vision of a future in which women and men share equal responsibilities 
in work, family and politics.  
 
Since the introduction of gender mainstreaming by the European Commission in 1996, the EU has 
taken steps to encourage the adoption of gender mainstreaming among member states. The EU educates 
leaders from the member states on gender mainstreaming in an effort to increase awareness of this policy 
agenda. Since 2003, the Commission of European Communities’ Unit on Equal Opportunities for Women 
and Men has been required to present an annual report on gender mainstreaming in the EU to the European 
Council and European Parliament. With the introduction of a new roadmap for equality between women and 
men in place for 2006-2010 and with 2007 designated the European Year of Opportunity for All, the propa-
gation of gender mainstreaming shows no immediate signs of abating, although it is in a constant state of 
transformation. Perhaps most importantly for member states, receipt of various forms of EU monies is con-
tingent on the implementation of gender mainstreaming programs at the national level within member states. 
 
Intended to complement positive action programs for women, rather than to replace them, gender 
mainstreaming has proven contentious among feminist activists, scholars, and policymakers. Walby (2005) 
has identified no fewer than six major areas of debate related to gender mainstreaming, while Woodward 
(2003) discusses an additional three areas of conflict uniquely different from those Walby addresses. Some 
question whether gender mainstreaming offers a meaningful or viable strategy for reducing gender inequality 
(Booth and Bennett 2002; Verloo 2001). Others fear that if gender mainstreaming moves gender issues out of 
the policy ghetto, it will also move gender issues out of the control of feminists, thus resulting in dilution 
(Woodward 2003). Recent critiques have questioned whether gender mainstreaming necessarily reflects and 
promotes a feminist agenda, or if its more gender neutral approach undercuts feminist politics (Lombardo 
and Meier 2006). Another major concern is that, in climates hostile to women’s interests, gender mainstream-
ing will provide a smokescreen behind which state actors can reduce or eliminate programs specifically target-
ing women, such as affirmative action policies or funds for services for women (Stratigaki 2005; Woodward 
2003). 
 
That EU policies and practices of gender mainstreaming are themselves sometimes contradictory, or 
involve multiple approaches to gender inequality, further renders the concept “fuzzy” (Booth and Bennett 
2002). This fuzziness is only enhanced by the complexity of gender mainstreaming, both as an idea and as a 
program to be implemented. Various EU documents lay out a series of sophisticated discussions of the prem-
ise of gender mainstreaming, as well as of the various methods of implementation. The idea is difficult to cap-
ture in a sound bite or even in a brochure; as one respondent in this project declared, “You can’t even explain 
it one sentence. You have to use ten sentences, and then attend a seminar!”  
 
An additional challenge to the successful diffusion of the gender mainstreaming agenda is that it is 
referred to in English throughout the member states of the European Union, rather than being translated into 
languages specific to each member state. Even in English, the term has little intuitive meaning, but in other 
languages it is often difficult to pronounce, let alone understand. As an English phrase in non-English-
speaking nations, it can be interpreted as nonsensical and foreign (Booth and Bennett 2002). 
 
To date, gender mainstreaming has also not attracted significant attention from national women’s 
movements within the EU. Woodward (2003) argues that gender mainstreaming should be attractive to femi-
nist social movement actors because it presents a unique opportunity to move women’s issues out of the pol-
icy ghetto, and offers an innovative and potentially revolutionary new model for gender relations. In their 
analysis of gender mainstreaming diffusion in 157 countries, True and Mintrom (2001) find that feminist 
transnational advocacy networks involving femocrats and international nongovernmental organizations play a 
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key role in the dissemination and implementation of gender mainstreaming. Yet locally-based, grassroots 
feminist social movement organizations within EU member states have been relatively quiet on this issue.  
 
In Germany, non-state feminists have not rallied around gender mainstreaming. Although feminist 
social movement actors arguably should be those serving as gender mainstreaming watchdogs, this does not 
appear to be occurring at the national level in Germany. This may be because feminist activity in Germany 
tends to be more localized, occurring primarily at the level of municipalities and local states. Gender main-
streaming could be a useful policy paradigm for promoting feminist interests at subnational levels of govern-
ance, and certainly the EU intends for gender mainstreaming to be implemented at all levels of the state. Yet 
gender mainstreaming is experiencing uneven adoption across local feminist movements.  
  
Background & Methods 
 
To explore the reception of gender mainstreaming among feminist social movement actors and 
femocrats, I compare how the local women’s movements in two cities in eastern Germany, Rostock and Er-
furt, have responded to this policy agenda. As indicated earlier, state and feminist social movement actors 
have adopted gender mainstreaming to very different degrees in these two cities. This cannot be explained by 
the demographic features of the two cities, as they are of equal size and are home to populations with virtually 
identical characteristics in terms of distribution by age, gender, race, income, educational attainment and so 
forth. Both cities operate with comparable budgets and face the same core problems that all cities in eastern 
Germany have grappled with since German unification in 1990, namely high unemployment, slow economic 
redevelopment and the devastating out-migration of residents to western Germany or other parts of Europe. 
They also share virtually identical structures of local governance.  
 
Both cities also have vibrant feminist movements. Although feminist organizing in eastern Germany 
has fallen out of the limelight since the collapse of state socialism in 1989 and the unification of East and 
West Germany in 1990, it continues at the local level there (Guenther 2006). Seeking both outlets for their 
feminist political impulses and sources of employment during an era of major economic upheaval, many 
women who joined the national-level mobilizations of 1989-90 have since turned to local women’s projects 
that are typically organized around a specific feminist issue, such as violence against women or women’s em-
ployment opportunities (Lang 2000). These organizations usually offer both social service provisioning, such 
as rape crisis and domestic violence intervention counseling, or job training and referrals, while also engaging 
in policy advocacy targeting mostly municipalities and local states.  
 
Although there is a good deal of variation across organizations comprising them, these local feminist 
movements may be fairly described as state-centered. Feminist organizations in eastern Germany often re-
ceive a significant proportion of funding from state agencies, and organizations routinely work closely with 
femocrats, many of whom in turn are also involved in feminist organizations as members of boards of direc-
tors or as staff or volunteers. Most femocratic positions, such as municipal Gender Equity Representatives, or 
political appointees who oversee matters related to gender and women in municipal governance, and who 
serve to support and assist women’s organizations and individual women, were created in 1990 without signi-
ficant input or pressure from feminist organizers (Ferree 1995; Lang 2000). Still, increasing the capacity of 
Gender Equity Representatives at the municipal and local state levels has been a key goal of feminist mobili-
zations in eastern Germany. Feminist organizations and femocrats work to mutually establish and reinforce 
one another’s legitimacy, and typically work closely together. While this state dependence may be problematic 
as some critics of state-centered or “NGO feminism” have noted (Einhorn 2000; Einhorn and Sever 2003; 
Lang 2000), it would also suggest that both movements would be competent and able to respond to a new 
policy paradigm such as gender mainstreaming.  
 
The present analysis draws on observations, archival data and in-depth interviews with sixty-three 
feminist activists, or women who are or have been active in the women’s movement at some point since 
1989, and femocrats, or elected or appointed feminist state officials, in Rostock and Erfurt, to tease out why 
feminist organizations in Rostock have adopted gender mainstreaming while those in Erfurt have not. I con-
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ducted semi-structured interviews with thirty-two women in Rostock and thirty-one women in Erfurt.1 In 
Rostock, the sample included five women who function primarily as femocrats, and twenty-seven women 
who are principally activists.2 Because Erfurt is also the capital city of the state of Thüringen, the sample 
there includes a greater proportion of femocrats: eight women served primarily as femocrats, while the 
remaining twenty-three were activists. Interviews generally lasted at least ninety minutes, and were routinely as 
long as three to four hours. During these conversations, respondents and I discussed various aspects of their 
work with women’s organizations and women’s politics, including gender mainstreaming. Interviews were 
especially useful in establishing participants’ views of gender mainstreaming and their understanding of why 
gender mainstreaming was or was not being adopted into their local women’s movement.  
                                                
 
Participant observation at state offices and women’s organizations augments the interview data, as 
does archival data from over two dozen women’s organizations and state offices in the two cities. Observa-
tions at meetings about gender mainstreaming were especially useful for acquiring information about how 
gender mainstreaming is framed and understood by feminist actors. Archival materials, on the other hand, of-
fered insight into the growth of emphasis on gender mainstreaming within feminist organizations. Meeting 
notes and newsletters from organizations, as well as certain legislative documents, reveal how gender main-
streaming is understood among, and marketed to, movement participants, policymakers and the public. All 
data analysis was completed in the original German; translations here are mine.  
 
Qualitative data are especially well suited for exploring how social actors make sense of new policy 
paradigms. While the literature on policy diffusion is dominated by quantitative approaches, qualitative ap-
proaches to policy diffusion enrich discussions about the circumstances under which policy ideas take hold by 
unearthing processes of meaning making. In the case of gender mainstreaming, qualitative methods help clar-
ify the complexity of grappling with new policy agendas and with understandings of gender by exploring how 
activists on the ground experience and understand this new policy paradigm and its relationship to existing 
strategies for resisting unequal gender relations.  
 
Gender Innovations in the Feminist Movement in Rostock 
 
Beginning already in the late 1990s, when gender mainstreaming was first appearing on the EU agen-
da, feminists in Rostock began integrating the perspective into their work with feminist organizations there. 
By 2000, feminist activists in Rostock had founded a women’s organization dedicated solely to education and 
advocacy around gender mainstreaming (German-speakers may visit the organization at http://www.gm-
consult-mv.org). Several other organizations were receiving funding for services through EU programs spe-
cifically supporting or espousing gender mainstreaming. With shepherding from the city’s Gender Equity 
Representative, Rostock became the first municipality in Germany to pass a citywide gender mainstreaming 
ordinance in 2001.  
 
 The adoption and implementation of gender mainstreaming in feminist organizations—and, ulti-
mately, in the municipality—was swift and comprehensive. This is true even though only roughly one-third of 
respondents in this study from Rostock were strong advocates for gender mainstreaming. Another third were 
ambivalent about gender mainstreaming, or felt they didn’t know enough about it to take a strong position, 
while the final third of the sample held negative views towards gender mainstreaming. Most commonly, those 
who disliked gender mainstreaming feared it would undercut support for services specifically targeting wom-
 
1Men were not specifically excluded from the study, but none emerged as relevant for the goals of the larger research 
project. Importantly, my account does not include the voices of EU policymakers themselves. My interest here is not in 
how the EU intends for feminist activists to understand gender mainstreaming, but rather how they actually understand 
it it.  
2Many femocrats are also staff members, board members or volunteers with activist organizations. Likewise, many activ-
ists have served as political appointees. In assessing their primary roles, I identified women based on how they identify 
themselves and where they have done most of their work: either in state positions or in organizing positions outside of 
the state.  
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en, resented that it was not translated into German, and/or found it too complex to understand and therefore 
thought it would have limited public appeal.  
 
 Factors both internal and external to the feminist movement in Rostock help explain its rapid and 
open adoption by feminists there in spite of the apparent absence of unilateral support for gender main-
streaming among feminists. Internal factors include ideological congruence with gender mainstreaming, 
movement cohesion and cooperativeness, and the presence of credible feminist articulators. The gender 
mainstreaming framework took hold quickly in part because of the congruence between the gender main-
streaming framework and local feminist ideologies. Feminists in Rostock primarily emphasize women’s status 
as workers and their rights to participate fully in paid employment. Reflecting the gender ideology of the GDR, 
in which women and men were seen as collaborators in the socialist project and in which gender interests 
were positioned as threats to class solidarity, feminists in Rostock also stress the negative effects of gender in-
equality on both women and on men. Unlike more radical, separatist feminist ideologies common among 
women’s projects in western Germany, feminists in Rostock encourage men’s cooperation and believe that 
improving women’s status in society is beneficial to all. Following these logics, gender mainstreaming is iden-
tified as building on a positive dimension of the GDR and as the continuation of core values about gender 
from the socialist era because it does not focus only on women. Even many of those who held negative views 
of gender mainstreaming noted that it resonated with their general ideology. As one respondent put it, “Gen-
der mainstreaming just clicks here.”  
 
Ideological cohesion within the women’s movement and an environment of cooperation also helped 
speed the transmission and acceptance of gender mainstreaming. Women’s organizations in Rostock are 
closely networked, with many organizations operating under shared umbrellas or working in shared physical 
spaces. Most activists within the movement are friends. In this collegial and close-knit community, ideas are 
transmitted quickly and easily, and activists and femocrats tend to want to hear what others have to say and to 
support colleagues in new endeavors.  
 
As a result of these strong social networks, even feminists who are not especially supportive of gen-
der mainstreaming joined the effort to educate others about it. One long-time feminist, for example, worked 
closely to secure funding for several gender mainstreaming projects within the organization of which she is 
the director. She has also been a strong supporter of the one organization in Rostock dedicated exclusively to 
gender mainstreaming. Simultaneously, she has strong reservations about the policy agenda: 
 
You also have to approach gender mainstreaming quite critically. You can’t 
just assume that men are going to jump on the gender mainstreaming band-
wagon with a big cheer. Because, quite simply, they lose resource because of 
it…I don’t entirely trust the top-down approach [taken by the EU], and I 
am not convinced that this can work because so many different things 
would need to be changed, and we won’t find open doors and we’ll have to 
fight so much for it. That’s why I don’t assume that it will work out, that 
just because it’s called ‘gender mainstreaming,’ suddenly everyone will be 
sensitive to equality politics and march off in pursuit of gender equality.  
 
 This activist clearly has multiple concerns about gender mainstreaming, including about its effective-
ness, potential to effect change and strategy of implementation. Yet in spite of these reservations, she was 
able to set aside her concerns to support colleagues and friends who strongly advocate for gender main-
streaming, largely because she believes that a range of different approaches to tackling gender inequality is 
warranted.  
 
Finally, the presence of credible articulators within the local feminist movement facilitated the adop-
tion of gender mainstreaming. The women’s movement in Rostock includes several women who are especial-
ly well-positioned to disseminate information about gender mainstreaming. After unification, many East Ger-
man academics lost their jobs, and several former professors from the university in Rostock began working in 
women’s organizations instead. These women have experience and expertise in tackling complex concepts 
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such as gender mainstreaming, and in disseminating information to students. In Rostock, several former aca-
demics spearheaded the move towards gender mainstreaming, and serve as key educators on the topic. Other 
activists and policymakers in Rostock hold them in high regard as feminists and educators. These gender 
mainstreaming advocates have been able to quickly and effectively share information about gender main-
streaming.  
 
 Functioning both within and outside of the local feminist movement, ties to Scandinavia, and espe-
cially Sweden, also promoted the adoption of gender mainstreaming. Collaboration through a regional advo-
cacy network between activists and policymakers in Rostock and in Sweden also contributed to the adoption 
of the gender mainstreaming concept in Rostock (Adams and Kang 2007). Through these encounters, activ-
ists in Rostock were presented with a learning opportunity through which they were able to identify the bene-
fits of gender mainstreaming and understand how it might be implemented in their community. Early pro-
ponents of gender mainstreaming in Rostock included feminist activists and policymakers who have traveled 
to Sweden—often several times—as members of study groups invited by Swedish feminists and policymakers 
to learn about gender mainstreaming and to witness its effects. Sweden was a pioneer in the adoption of gen-
der mainstreaming, and leaders and activists in Rostock received frequent, comprehensive access to informa-
tion about gender mainstreaming via Swedish colleagues. As Uschi, a leader in an organization specifically 
dedicated to education on gender mainstreaming, explains:  
 
We tried quite hard to build this project out of the Swedish experience. In 
Sweden, people just take gender mainstreaming for granted; it’s just seen as 
something normal, as something that simply belongs in society, and as 
something that benefits everyone, women and men. And somehow it’s fun 
and just a part of their quality of life. And so we said, ‘Good, we’ll go check 
this thing out, to see what it’s all about,’ and then we organized many edu-
cational trips to Sweden. We also took many politicians with us so that they 
could just see what the situation there was like and truly experience the spir-
it of it, and we did a lot of publicizing about Swedish equality politics and 
gender mainstreaming. And [another activist] Rosamund organized a whole 
series of events about it, and really worked to build up a network…. And it 
became ever clearer to me that gender mainstreaming was practical, and 
that we really needed to bring it into our politics here, and also into the re-
gional politics [of the local state].... And with the help of the Landesfrauenrat 
[state women’s lobby], we did just that. 
 
In this account, Uschi describes gender mainstreaming as something that must be experienced in or-
der to be understood. To that end, she and her colleague worked to bring political and feminist leaders to 
Sweden to see first-hand how it benefits everyone. Through these experiences, she became increasingly con-
vinced of the importance of integrating gender mainstreaming into local politics, and worked with major 
women’s organizations to accomplish this. Activists and femocrats in Rostock came to view Swedish social 
policy, specifically as it pertains to gender politics, as the international leader, and they repeatedly invoked 
their efforts at following the Swedish models of high levels of state support for working parents and of gen-
der mainstreaming. 
 
Even the city of Rostock’s municipal ordinance on gender mainstreaming establishes its Swedish 
roots by referencing Swedish models of gender policy twice just in the law’s preamble. Already in its opening 
sentences, the ordinance draws directly on what policymakers in Rostock refer to as “the Swedish model.” 
Reference to Sweden is important because the city positions itself as more linked to the Scandinavian and 
Baltic states than to the unified Germany and western Europe (Guenther 2006). Situated on the Baltic sea-
coast, Rostock’s history has centered on its status as a port city and its connections with Scandinavia, and es-
pecially Sweden. Adopting gender mainstreaming builds on—and helps maintain—this important regional tie. 
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In terms of factors external to the feminist movement in Rostock, the broader political climate in the 
city and region has also played a critical part in the resonance and integration of gender mainstreaming there. 
Politics in Rostock and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern veer out of the German mainstream and to the left. While 
especially in the 1990s, many other regions in eastern Germany shunned the post-socialist reimagining of the 
ruling party of East Germany, the Baltic coast has consistently retained high levels of support for the Socialist 
left through 2006. The left-leaning political culture in Rostock and in the state of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 
has been highly supportive of women’s organizations since unification, in spite of budgetary issues that are 
becoming increasingly problematic. This has two important implications for the adoption and implementation 
of gender mainstreaming. First, femocrats, such as the municipal and statewide Gender Equity Representa-
tives, as well as local women’s organizations, and most especially the State Women’s Lobby, the non-partisan 
statewide political network of women’s organizations, have the legitimacy and capacity within the municipality 
and local state to introduce and pass new policy initiatives. Second, the local political climate has created a 
stable environment in which feminist activists can pursue diverse paradigms, such as gender mainstreaming, 
without the threat of losing state support. Rostock and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern offer an environment in 
which feminists feel safe to explore diverse policy paradigms. The idea of gender mainstreaming is relatively 
low-risk in this environment as the political and discursive opportunity structure in Rostock creates space for 
feminist experimentation. This increases the credibility of gender mainstreaming among feminist actors be-
cause, in this context, it seems plausible, if not probable, that the state will cooperate in meaningfully imple-
menting gender mainstreaming, while also continuing to support other feminist goals.  
 
A final external motivator is more instrumental, namely that the implementation of gender main-
streaming is also attached to the prospect of receiving EU funds. This further increases its appeal, especially 
among feminists working in local women’s organizations. Like many other eastern German cities, Rostock 
has experienced significant out-migration since 1990, dropping in size from just over 250,000 in 1989 to just 
under 200,000 in 2000. Coupled with the economic difficulties accompanying unification, out-migration has 
contributed to a shrinking tax base and smaller city coffers. While the city government supports the work of 
over a dozen women’s organizations offering services ranging from shelter for survivors of domestic violence 
to employment training, the city is unable to fully fund women’s organizations.3 The decline is municipal and 
local state funding in the late 1990s was offset by the introduction of EU funding sources focused on gender 
issues and gender mainstreaming. In the early 2000s, at least three women’s organizations in Rostock received 
the majority of their funding from the EU, and many more utilize EU funding to support specific initiatives 
or projects.  
 
In sum, Rostock’s position near Sweden and its regional identification and integration with Sweden 
enabled easy transmission of the concept of gender mainstreaming. Gender ideologies both within the local 
state and among feminist actors with which the concept of gender mainstreaming is highly congruent and 
resonant increased its appeal and rendered the policy agenda viable, even among those who are uncertain 
about it. The political arena is open to new ideas that stress equality, and femocrats in particular are seen as le-
gitimate participants in the political process. The strong capacity of feminist bureaucrats and activists, the en-
trenchment of Gender Equity Representatives within local levels of governance, and the responsiveness of 
the dominant political parties to feminist concerns created an environment in which gender mainstreaming 
could be effectively introduced, discussed, and implemented. The presence of credible local experts within the 
movement furthered understanding of the idea, and while gender mainstreaming may have taken hold in Ros-
tock with or without these women, they expedited its implementation in the work of women’s organizations 
and the local state. Ultimately, this confluence of factors internal and external to the feminist movement in 
Rostock rendered gender mainstreaming credible and salient for feminist activists and femocrats in Rostock, 
leading to its adoption there.  
 
 
                                                 
3Unlike the United States, neither western, but especially not eastern Germany, has a history of private philanthropy. 
Foundation monies and private donations are extremely uncommon.  
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Resisting Gender Mainstreaming in Erfurt 
 
The situation in Erfurt has been quite different. In Erfurt, gender mainstreaming has been conspicu-
ously absent from the agendas of feminist organizations or the feminist movement more broadly. Although in 
Erfurt, as in Rostock, individual responses to gender mainstreaming among feminists varied, feminist organi-
zations are not working towards integrating gender mainstreaming into their work. A small cadre comprised 
mostly of femocrats have attempted to propagate gender mainstreaming, but with limited success.  
 
Part of the difficulty these supporters face is that they are attempting to effect change within a highly 
polarized feminist movement in which many actors already feel threatened. The local state apparatus is domi-
nated by the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Germany’s largest right party, which typically avoids policy 
interventions into inequalities and is often hostile to feminist concerns. Activists in Erfurt consistently re-
ported that the local state is unsupportive of feminist issues, reluctant to subsidize feminist social service or-
ganizations, and unable to reconcile the religious underpinnings of the ruling party with women’s needs for 
child care, reproductive health, protection from violence and empowerment. This is especially the case for the 
local state of Thüringen, of which Erfurt is the capital city; feminists see the city government itself is seen as 
slightly more accessible, particularly in the early 1990s when the city provided a great deal of funding to femi-
nist social service providers. However, by the early 2000s, when gender mainstreaming was really appearing 
on the policy scene, both city and state were using the logic of budgetary shortfalls to curtail programs and 
services related to gender and feminist issues.  
 
The women’s movement in Erfurt has also struggled because of ideological conflicts within the 
movement itself. One major camp of feminists is radical separatist feminists. Gender mainstreaming is at 
odds with the inherent ideology of radical feminism on several fronts. First, it is a policy that emanates from, 
and centers on, the state, which radical feminists seek autonomy from and approach with wariness. Second, 
they interpret gender mainstreaming as overemphasizing the negative consequences of gender inequality for 
men and as failing to adequately address women’s oppression. In one conversation with a group of staff 
members and volunteers at a key radical feminist organization in Erfurt, the dominant theme was that the 
consequences of gender inequality are far more severe for women than for men, but gender mainstreaming 
tries to make it all sound the same. As staff members noted, in a patriarchal society, victims of battering, rape 
and incest are overwhelmingly women, and experiences with these forms of violence are far more detrimental 
to an individual’s mental and physical well-being than the more typically male experience of gender inequality 
in which men are positioned as secondary caregivers to children or as the primary breadwinner for a family. 
Finally, many radical feminists are suspicious of gender mainstreaming because of its similarity to the gender 
ideology of the GDR, which they feel offered a false promise of equality to mask what they saw as an inher-
ently patriarchal state.  
 
Somewhat ironically, the major proponents of gender mainstreaming in Erfurt are femocrats who are 
generally active in the CDU. At first glance, it would seem that gender mainstreaming would also not fare well 
among these women because of its emphasis on gender sameness as a desired outcome and its implicit sup-
port for a strong state that intervenes to reduce inequality, a violation of their support for free markets. Yet 
some of these feminists have actively embraced gender mainstreaming and now form a core group of gender 
mainstreaming advocates. For these women, gender mainstreaming is appealing primarily because it is seem-
ingly less radical than the radical feminists’ models for gender relations. Since it addresses men’s concerns as 
well as women’s concerns, conservative feminists hope that gender mainstreaming will be less threatening to 
male colleagues than other feminist concepts, and therefore may have a higher chance of effecting change. 
While they think the so-called Swedish model “goes too far”—especially insofar as they believe women 
should be primarily responsible for the care of very young children—they support the basic idea that women 
and men should have more equal opportunities in education, employment, and balancing work and family ob-
ligations.  
 
This small pool of gender mainstreaming advocates has had little success in changing the minds of 
their peers within the women’s movement more broadly. The fear that the state will use gender mainstream-
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ing to undercut the few programs for women the movement has succeeded in securing seems like too great a 
risk for most activists and femocrats to support the idea. Unlike those in Rostock, feminists in Erfurt operate 
under the constant threat of a conservative state apparatus that has little interest in women’s issues. The inter-
pretation of experience can eliminate alternatives from the repertoire available to potential social movement 
and policy innovators; in this case, feminists’ negative experiences in making demands of the state limit their 
willingness to engage with a potentially risky policy advance. Because the women’s movement in Erfurt—in-
cluding both radical and more conservative feminist groups—has routinely encountered roadblocks in trying 
to effect change through state institutions, the idea of introducing a new agenda seems unfeasible, if not dan-
gerous.  
 
Given its proximity to western Germany and its solid transportation infrastructure, as well as its 
negative evaluations of life under socialism and positive interpretation of unification, Erfurt, and its local 
women’s movement, is significantly influenced by western Germany. The autonomous women’s movement 
in western Germany, some of whose members are active coalition partners with radical feminists in Erfurt, 
also views gender mainstreaming with skepticism. Western German feminists transmit rumors to feminists in 
Erfurt that some state offices and autonomous women’s organizations focused on gender issues in cities and 
states in western Germany were shut down or lost their funding after municipal and local state governments 
implemented gender mainstreaming.4 Close linkages between feminists in Erfurt and western German femi-
nists—particularly apparent in coalition work between radical separatist feminists from both sides of the for-
mer border—results in the transmission of fears in the western German women’s project culture to Erfurt.  
 
Tatiana, a state representative for an opposition party on the left, expresses these fears: 
 
I also have big concerns about it, that there is little readiness for real 
change. Right now, I see more of the dangers of gender mainstreaming 
[than of its possible benefits], that through it we can find a justification for 
weakening support for women, but without any possibility of replacing 
women’s politics with something new. 
 
Here, Tatiana, like many of her colleagues in government and feminist organizations, also references 
the many frames for dealing with gender inequality. Since unification, there has been a parade of catchwords: 
women’s politics (Frauenpolitik), support for women and women’s issues (Frauenförderung), and gender equality 
politics (Gleichstellungspolitik). Each has a slightly different connotation in terms of emphasis and, according to 
some, degree of critical feminism. Radical feminists especially tend to resist the move from woman-centered 
to gender-centered rhetoric, evident also in the change in rubric from women’s politics to gender equality 
politics, and from stressing women’s subordinate status to emphasizing gender inequalities. 
 
That gender mainstreaming is especially complex doesn’t make it any easier to increase its appeal. 
Coupled with the state’s unresponsiveness to feminist concerns, this complexity limits femocrats’ willingness 
to push the issue. As one respondent, Sonja, an upper-level femocrat who identifies herself as a supporter of 
gender mainstreaming, told me: 
 
Already the wording of it makes it almost impossible to translate into Ger-
man. Maybe it works in England, but here it just doesn’t make any sense…. 
You have to explain so much about it, and that simply makes it difficult. I 
think support for women was already difficult enough to justify. It’s my 
feeling that, well, in the last few years, we started to notice that we were 
making progress. Things got a little better. One started to feel accepted and 
it was certainly the case that we were integrated. But now with this new 
gender agenda, or gender mainstreaming, this is again something that, in my 
                                                 
4I was unable to corroborate these claims. 
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view, is difficult, because it’s something new again and not a soul under-
stands it and no one wants to hear about it.  
 
In this account, gender mainstreaming is a cause for concern because it is difficult to explain and to 
comprehend, and would potentially try the patience of fellow policymakers. Sonja also feels that her office 
has been successful in making inroads in the last few years, and that attempting to introduce a new concept—
and such a complex one at that—will undermine their gradual progress.  
 
Interestingly, feminist activists in Erfurt fail to see any benefits from gender mainstreaming, and are 
largely not enticed by the possible monetary benefits of adopting gender mainstreaming programs or perspec-
tives within their organizations, even though they, as a whole, receive far less support from the city and the 
local state than their counterparts in Rostock. Given the extreme difficulty they have experienced in securing 
municipal and statewide funding for women’s organizations, these women should presumably embrace a new 
resource for funding their organizations. Instead, ideological and political considerations mostly outweigh 
economic necessity.  
 
Still, some women are more optimistic than Sonja about the prospects of gender mainstreaming in 
Erfurt. Maria, a state representative for the CDU, discusses some of the problems she has encountered with 
gender mainstreaming, as well as her hopes for this policy agenda: 
 
…When one meets a state representative outside of the parliament—the 
men, anyway—they approach me and say, ‘Gender mainstreaming! Now 
you’ve really cooked up something new, you women. Isn’t it enough for 
you that you’re already involved everywhere?’ Because they don’t under-
stand it…The first time we brought up the issue of violence against women, 
they all laughed, ‘Now she shows up with this issue in which no one is in-
terested. It’s all bunk. That only happens in the lower social classes, in the 
asocial milieu; normal people don’t beat each other up.’ But now we’ve 
achieved that everyone says, ‘OK, you were actually right. When you really 
look around, this does happen.’ So I hope the same will happen [with gen-
der mainstreaming], only it is a process that will take a long time. 
 
Here, Maria reports that male colleagues in the state parliament see gender mainstreaming as the lat-
est in a string of feminist concoctions. While aware of men’s resistance to gender mainstreaming, she also 
knows that change takes time, and she hopes that resistance to gender mainstreaming will erode over time, 
just as resistance to attention to the issue of domestic violence did.  
 
Given the lack of legitimacy of the core group of advocates in Erfurt, however, this seems unlikely. 
The propagation of gender mainstreaming has been slowed by the absence of credible leaders focusing on 
this topic and by the fact that femocrats and feminist activists alike have low levels of legitimacy in the eyes of 
the state and therefore limited capacity to effect change. The women CDU politicians with an interest in gen-
der mainstreaming are a small and relatively powerless group within their own party, which is significantly 
more male-dominated than the other major political parties. They also have histories of animosity with radical 
feminists and feminist organizations in Erfurt and Thüringen. Unlike in Rostock, the women in Erfurt who 
support gender mainstreaming participate in a highly divided women’s movement. As such, the elected CDU 
officials are neither credible among their political colleagues nor among the radical feminists who dominate 
the non-profit sector and the women’s political lobby. The latter point further undermines their credibility 
with other state leaders, who wonder aloud “who these so-called leaders even represent since the feminists 
can’t even get it together.” Consequently, their power to introduce new legislative agendas is limited.  
 
In sum, gender mainstreaming is not entirely resonant with either radical or more moderate and con-
servative feminists in the women’s movement in Erfurt, but some conservative feminists have accepted it as 
worthwhile cause nonetheless, viewing it as a more promising route to gender equality than radical feminist 
politics. However, given the ideological rifts within the movement, they are not legitimate articulators of gen-
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der mainstreaming among other feminists, and thus the concept has not spread within the movement. Like-
wise, they aren’t credible within the dominant political party, and can’t effect change there, either. The conser-
vative political climate increases perceived threat among members of both ideological camps, but especially 
for radical feminists. Coupled with the spread of fears about gender mainstreaming from western Germany 
coalition partners, the low level of state responsiveness to feminist demands also limits opportunities for ac-
tivists and femocrats to feel safe enough to take risks with a new policy idea.  
 
Conclusion  
 
While Europeanization may well be an important new force leading to greater policy homogeneity in 
Europe, local settings continue to serve as important filters for how international pressures and agendas are 
negotiated. Feminist movements develop responses to new policy ideas that are grounded in specific, local 
experiences. Factors both internal and external to feminist movements shape the organized response to new 
policy paradigms. Table 1 lists the factors that emerged as especially salient during the course of this analysis. 
The structure and cohesion of women’s movements, local political cultures and opportunity structures, and 
femocrats’ capacity have effected whether or not gender mainstreaming is adopted in Rostock and Erfurt.  
 
Extant perspectives on policy diffusion among states and institutions are helpful in explaining diffu-
sion among social movements. A lack of adoption among movements doesn’t necessarily indicate a lack of 
support, nor does adoption mean a movement supports a policy. Rather, factors both internal and external to 
these local feminist movements are implicated in the responses to gender mainstreaming within them. Impor-
tantly, while internal and external pressures that contribute to diffusion are often viewed as dichotomous, this 
analysis reveals that the categories of internal and external forces are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Link-
ages between the state and feminist organizations bridge the boundary between endogenous and exogenous 
forces. Some broader social forces—like ties to specific other regions—also effect both movements and the 
broader structures in which they are embedded, like the local state.  
 
The ultimate integration of gender mainstreaming into feminist politics and organizing in Rostock 
and Erfurt is dependent not on individual responses to the policy initiative, but rather on structural features 
of these two movements and the environments in which they operate. In fact, rates of support for gender 
mainstreaming among feminist activists were roughly equal in the two cities. What emerges as more impor-
tant than attitudes towards gender mainstreaming is the capacity for local feminist movements to take on a 
new policy paradigm.  
 
Table 1: Factors Shaping Responses to Gender Mainstreaming 
Mainstreaming in Rostock and Erfurt 
 
 Rostock Erfurt 
Ideological cohesion & 
resonance 
High Low 
Sense of threat, conflict 
& competition 
Low High 
Internal (Movement) 
Factors 
Credible articulators Present Absent 
Political climate Left Right 
State responsiveness to 
feminist demands 
Responsive Unresponsive 
External factors 
Regional orientation Sweden Western Germany 
Outcome Response to gender 
mainstreaming 
Adoption Rejection 
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This capacity in turn is shaped by numerous factors. In Rostock, the left-leaning political climate, 
state receptiveness to feminist demands and the high capacity of femocrats created an environment in which 
gender mainstreaming was highly resonant, and which was also well-suited to actually implementing it. His-
toric and contemporary ties to Sweden provided an additional learning opportunity for both activists and pol-
icymakers, and the adoption of gender mainstreaming allowed both groups to make claims of building on an 
important transnational partnership.  
 
In contrast, Erfurt’s conservative political climate produced a state apparatus more closed to feminist 
concerns, and where the capacity of femocrats and feminist activists was limited both by political considera-
tions and ideological rifts within the local women’s movement itself. Here, ties to western Germany and west-
ern German feminists facilitated the movement of distrust of gender mainstreaming from the autonomous 
women’s movement in western Germany to radical feminists especially. Hence, feminists in Erfurt perceive 
gender mainstreaming as a risk and have not worked to adopt it. For activists and femocrats in Rostock there 
was little to lose, whereas for those in Erfurt the stakes seemed much higher, given the already precarious 
perch of the women’s movement. The contours of these safe zones were influenced by regional influences 
and localized understandings of gender under socialism and capitalism.  
 
In order to adopt and organize around a new policy idea, local social movements need an appropriate 
context of support. The opportunity to engage with a newer policy paradigm that supports movement goals is 
not sufficient for social movements to mobilize around a policy. A context of support is especially critical if, 
as in the case of gender mainstreaming, a new policy idea can be interpreted as either an opportunity or as a 
threat to movement interests. Such supportive contexts include a conjuncture of factors, including movement 
cohesion and resources, open political opportunity structures and alignment between movement goals and 
policymakers’ goals, and possibilities for learning and/or validation from external actors.  
 
 In addition to identifying factors salient for the diffusion of a new policy paradigm within social 
movements, this comparative analysis also illuminates the range of responses to gender mainstreaming among 
femocrats and feminist activists working at subnational levels. The concerns about gender mainstreaming ac-
tivists and local femocrats express largely mirror those feminist scholars identify in the academic literature, 
with some important omissions and differences in emphasis. Like feminist scholars, activists and femocrats 
expressed concern that gender mainstreaming could be used as a tool to undermine programs focused exclu-
sively on women and/or women’s issues. They also widely noted the complexity of the concept as inhibiting 
or retarding adoption, even in Rostock. However, none of the respondents in either city expressed any con-
cern about what relationship gender mainstreaming might have to other inequalities, such as those based on 
race, ethnicity or sexuality. Furthermore, although it would be inaccurate to state that localized actors weren’t 
attuned to, or interested in, the contradictions between gender mainstreaming and various feminist ideologies, 
there was, relative to the scholarly feminist discourse on gender mainstreaming, less emphasis among these 
women in general on the feminist politics of gender mainstreaming and greater emphasis on the material and 
practical implications of gender mainstreaming.  
 
New policy agendas introduced by outside actors interact with local social movements in diverse 
ways, not all of which have positive outcomes for local movements. In Rostock, the end effect of the EU’s 
introduction of gender mainstreaming has been largely positive, building cohesion within the local feminist 
movement, providing access to new funding resources, and reinforcing the capacity of femocrats. Gender 
mainstreaming appears to be on a path of entrenchment in Rostock. On the other hand, gender mainstream-
ing has dug the wedge between different camps of feminists in Erfurt even deeper, and has made femocrats 
and activists within the many struggling organizations there feel threatened. Supranational policymakers 
should work towards greater awareness of the presumably unintended consequences of new policy para-
digms. Particularly critical is that EU policymakers must more clearly delineate if and how gender main-
streaming programs will compete with other programs for women and work to demonstrate that gender 
mainstreaming is complementary, and not competitive, with these programs and services.  
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